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The traditional approach in human rights law is to hold States, and only States, 
responsible for human rights. The 2011 Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights’ Statement on the obligations of States Parties regarding the corporate sector 
and economic, social and cultural rights (hereafter: CESCR Statement) is representative 
of this approach. In response to the growing role played by non-state actors, rather than 
to emphasize these non-state actors’ own human rights obligations, “the Committee 
increasingly addresses the obligations of States parties regarding the impact of the 
corporate sector on the implementation of the rights under the Covenant.” (emphasis 
added).2 The Committee’s starting point is clear: “States Parties have the primary 
obligation to respect, protect and fulfil the Covenant rights of all persons under their 
jurisdiction in the context of corporate activities, undertaken by state-owned or private 
enterprises.”3 
 
                                                 
1 Law and Development Research Group, University of Antwerp Law Research School; chair of the 
Research Networking Programme Beyond Territoriality: Globalisation and Transnational Human Rights 
Obligations (GLOTHRO), which is funded by the European Science Foundation. This paper has been 
written in the framework of GLOTHRO and in the framework of the research project DER2010-18780 
entitled The Responsibility of Spanish Transnational Corporations in the field of Human Rights funded by 
the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Innovation and FEDER. 
2 Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Statement on the obligations of States Parties 
regarding the corporate sector and economic, social and cultural rights, UN Doc. E/C.12/2011/1 of 20 
May 2011, para. 1. 
3 Ibid., para. 3. 
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Territorial States legally bear the primary responsibility4 for human rights 
violations, but they are not always able (nor willing) to live up to their human rights 
obligations. Decisions of other, equally powerful actors, such as international economic 
institutions, transnational corporations and/or other States may have a much larger and 
profound impact on the realisation of socio-economic human rights than the territorial 
State has. As Joseph has pointed out, “Given the potential for [transnational 
corporations] to translate their economic power into potentially huge de facto political 
power, it is perhaps unrealistic to expect  human rights accountability [regarding 
transnational corporations] to emanate exclusively from host States.”5 It therefore 
makes sense to make these other actors equally responsible for human rights. In this 
paper, we will only zoom in on other States, i.e. the home State/State of incorporation of 
transnational corporations, in addition to the host State as the traditional duty-bearer. 
There is a wealth of literature addressing the responsibilities and obligations of 
corporations themselves in particular.6 
 
To avoid any misunderstanding, discussing the human rights obligations of other 
actors than the host State does not mean that the host State is let off the hook. As Kinley 
and Chambers put it, “from the expansion of sites of responsibility [does not come] a 
corresponding reduction of a state’s liability in respect of human rights protection and 
promotion.”7 Elsewhere, Kinley has rightfully argued in favour of the “[domestic] 
state’s essential guardianship of human rights within the context of the global 
economy”.8 
 
In what follows, we will focus on the State duty to protect human rights as 
envisaged in the 2011 UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights 
                                                 
4 Responsibility is used here in its plain language meaning, and not in the specific sense of the ILC 
Articles on State Responsibility. In the latter, responsibility is confined to a violations approach, i.e. 
responsibility is engaged as a result of attributable conduct that constitutes a breach of an international 
obligation. We use responsbility here to refer in a general way to the set of human rights obligations 
incumbent on a particular state. 
5 S. JOSEPH, “An Overview of the Human Rights Accountability of Multinational Enterprises”, in M. 
KAMMINGA and S. ZIA-ZARIFI (eds.), Liability of Multinational Corporations under International 
Law, 2000, The Hague, Kluwer Law International, pp. 75-93, at 78. 
6 See inter alia R. MARES (ed.), The UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights – 
Foundations and Implementation, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden, 2012; A. MCBETH, International 
Economic Actors and Human Rights, Routledge, London, 2010, pp. 243-323 in particular; D. KINLEY, 
Civilising Globalisation. Human Rights and the Global Economy, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 2009, pp. 145-203 in particular; O. DE SCHUTTER (ed.) Transnational Companies and 
Human Rights, Portland, Oxford, 2006; A. CLAPHAM, Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors, 
Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2006, in particular pp. 195-270; N. JÄGERS, Corporate Human Rights 
Obligations: In Search Of Accountability, Intersentia, Antwerp, 2002; M. KAMMINGA and S. ZIA-
ZARIFI, Liability of Multinational Corporations under International Law, Kluwer International Law, 
The Hague, 2000. 
7 D. KINLEY and R. CHAMBERS, “The UN Human Rights Norms for Corporations: The Private 
Implications of Public International Law”, 6 Human Rights Law Review 2006, pp. 447-497, at 481. 
8 D. KINLEY, Civilising Globalisation. Human Rights and the Global Economy, Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge, 2009, 222. 
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(hereafter: the Guiding Principles).9 The Guiding Principles build on the Protect, 
Respect and Remedy Framework10 that was earlier developed by Ruggie as the Special 
Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights and 
Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises has now concluded his 
work.11 As pointed out by Jägers, “Ruggie has steered determinedly away from the 
concept of human rights obligations for corporations and instead placed exclusive 
emphasis on the State as the sole duty-bearer.”12 The Guiding Principles therefore 
mainly emphasize the State obligation to protect. Where relevant, we will also draw on 
the 2003 Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other 
Business Enterprises with regard to Human Rights (2003) (hereafter: the Norms)13 and 
the 2011 Maastricht Principles on Extraterritorial Obligations in the Area of Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (hereafter: the Maastricht Principles).14 The Norms built on 
the work of Weisbrodt, and were initially drafted as a code of conduct for transnational 
corporations.15 They were adopted in 2003 by the UN Sub-Commission on the 
Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, but rejected by the UN Commission on 
Human Rights in 2004, following a hostile reception by the business community. The 
Maastricht Principles have emanated from a process of reflection and discussion on the 
extraterritorial obligations of States in the area of economic, social and cltural rights, 
which culminated in an expert meeting in Maastricht, on which occasion the Maastricht 
Principles were adopted. 
 
Central to our analysis is an attempt to flesh out the obligation to protect human 
rights as incumbent on the host State on the one hand, and on the home State/State of 
incorporation (where applicable) on the other hand.  
 
II. THE GUIDING PRINCIPLES 
 
The Guiding Principles consists of both foundational and operational principles. 
They lay primary human rights responsibility, also with regard to corporate conduct, 
                                                 
9 Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights and 
Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, John Ruggie, Guiding Principles on 
Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations “Protect, Respect and Remedy” 
Framework, UN Doc. A/HRC/17/31 of 21 March 2011. 
10 For all documents, see www.business-humanrights.org/SpecialRepPortal/Home. 
11 For an excellent overview of Ruggie’s work, see R. MARES, “Business and Human Rights After 
Ruggie: Foundations, the Art of Simplification and the Imperative of Cumulative Progress”, in R. 
MARES (ed.), The UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights – Foundations and 
Implementation, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden, 2012, pp. 1-50. 
12 N. JÄGERS, “UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Making Headway towards Real 
Corporate Accountability?”, 29/2 Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights 2011, pp. 159-163, at 160. 
13 Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, Norms on the Responsibilities of 
Transnational Corporations and other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights, UN Doc. 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2 of 26 August 2003. 
14 The Maastricht Principles can be found on 
www.icj.org/dwn/database/Maastricht%20ETO%20Principles%20-%20FINAL.pdf and have been 
published in 29/4 Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights 2011, pp. 578-590. 
15 D. KINLEY and R. CHAMBERS, “The UN Human Rights Norms for Corporations: The Private 
Implications of Public International Law”, 6 Human Rights Law Review 2006, pp. 447-497, at 454. 
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with States. Obligations of the host and home State are differentiated at the level of 
foundational principles. Human rights responsibility lies primarily and as a strong 
obligation with the host State, and much more weakly with the home State of a business 
enterprise. Foundational Principle 1 holds that the host States “must protect against 
human rights abuse within their territory and/or jurisdiction by […] business enterprises. 
This requires taking appropriate steps to prevent, investigate, punish and redress such 
abuse through effective policies, legislation, regulations and adjudication.” This host 
State duty to protect is said to be a standard of conduct.16 The responsibility of the home 
State to regulate the extraterritorial activities of businesses domiciled in their territory 
and/or jurisdiction is framed much more weakly as a soft obligation “to set out clearly 
the expectation” that these business enterprises “respect human rights throughout their 
operations”.17  
 
At the level of operational principles, such a watertight division between the 
human rights responsibility of the host and home State is much more difficult to 
maintain. Operational Principle 3 lists the general State regulatory and policy functions, 
such as law enforcement, human rights friendly laws and policies; and encouragement 
or requirement of self-reporting by business on human rights impacts. While these 
regulatory and policy functions are certainly incumbent on host States, they may also 
apply to home States. The soft obligation in 3 (c) to “[p]rovide effective guidance to 
business enterprises on how to respect human rights throughout their operations” hints 
most explicitly at home State responsibility by using the terminology of “throughout 
their operations”. The Commentary clarifies that such guidance should advise on human 
rights due diligence18 and how to consider questions of vulnerability and 
marginalization. 
 
Operational Principles 4 to 6 focus on the State-business nexus: additional steps 
are required when business enterprises are owned or controlled by the State, or when 
they receive substantial support and services from the State, e.g. from export credit 
agencies and official investment insurance or guarantee agencies. Here too, human 
rights due diligence is put forward as the norm to be imposed. In case of privatisation, 
exercise of adequate oversight by the State is expected. Finally, States “should promote 
respect for human rights by business enterprises with which they conduct commercial 
transactions”,19 e.g. in procurement. While these obligations may apply to host and 
home States equally, no explicit reference is made to home States in the commentaries 
to these Principles. The same goes for the Operational Principle 8 on internal policy 
coherence, i.e. making sure that those State administrations that shape business practices 
observe a State’s human rights obligations. Operational Principle 9 on maintaining 
“adequate domestic policy space” to meet one’s human rights obligations, e.g. when 
providing investor protection, clearly concerns host States (in the South) in particular. 
                                                 
16 Guiding Principles, para. 1, Commentary. 
17 Guiding Principles, para. 2. 
18 For an exploration of the concept in both corporate law, human rights law and Ruggie’s framework, see 
T. LAMBOOY, “Corporate Due Diligence as a Tool to Respect Human Rights”, 28/3 Netherlands 
Quarterly of Human Rights 2010, pp. 404-448. 
19 Guiding Principles, para. 6. 
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Home States (in the North) are more in particular addressed in Operational Principle 
10, that deals with the human rights obligations of States when acting as members of 
multilateral institutions. They are most explicitly addressed in Operational Principle 7 
that deals with conflict-affected areas. States “should help to ensure that business 
enterprises operating in [conflict-affected areas] are not involved with [gross human 
rights abuses]”. The Commentary explains that 
 
[i]n conflict-affected areas, the “host” State may be unable to protect human rights 
adequately due to a lack of effective control. Where transnational corporations are 
involved, their “home” States therefore have roles to play in assisting both those 
corporations and host States to ensure that businesses are not involved with human 
rights abuse […]. To achieve greater policy coherence and assist business 
enterprises adequately in such situations, home States should foster closer 
cooperation among their development assistance agencies, foreign and trade 
ministries, and export finance institutions in their capitals and within their 
embassies, as well as between these agencies and host Government actors […]. 
 
Further on in the Commentary, the possibility of “exploring civil, administrative or 
criminal liability for enterprises domiciled or operating in their territory and/or 
jurisdiction that commit or contribute to gross human rights abuses” is mentioned, 
which seems to apply both to host and home States, given the references to domicile, 
territory and jurisdiction. 
 
The Guiding Principles, to the (limited) extent that they identify home State human 
rights responsibility, hardly clarify the division of responsibility among host and home 
States. Only in the case of involvement of transnational corporations in gross human 
rights violations in conflict-affected areas, some light is shed on the division of 
responsibility between the host and home State, albeit that the commentary weakly 
defines the responsibility of home States as having “roles to play in assisting both those 
corporations and host States”. Justification for the home State obligation is sought in the 
fact that “the ‘host’ State may be unable to protect human rights adequately due to a 
lack of effective control.”20 So, in these particular instances that transnational 
corporations are involved in gross human rights violations in conflict-affected areas, 
responsibility tilts towards the home State, which then also has more specific 
obligations. As to the relationship of State obligations with the direct responsibility of 
transnational corporations, no clarification can be found in the Guiding Principles. 
 
The rationale for prioritising (host) State human rights obligations can be found in 
the 2008 Respect, Protect and Remedy Framework.21 Ruggie argues there that the State 
duty to protect “lies at the very core of the international human rights regime”,22 as the 
                                                 
20 Guiding Principles, para. 7, Commentary. 
21 Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights and 
Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, John Ruggie, Protect, Respect and Remedy: 
a Framework for Business and Human Rights, UN Doc. A/HRC/8/5 of 7 April 2008. 
22 Ibid., para. 9. 
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latter “rests upon the bedrock role of States”.23 The Special Representative’s account of 
the state-of-the-art of international law on State human rights obligations is the 
following: (host) States have an obligation to protect against human rights abuses by 
corporations affecting persons within their territory or jurisdiction, through regulation 
and adjudication. While home States are not required to help prevent human rights 
violations by corporations based within their territory, they are free to do so under a 
two-fold condition: there needs to be a recognized basis of jurisdiction and the actions 
of the home State need to meet an overall reasonableness test (including the principle of 
non-intervention in internal affairs).24 For sure, this position draws on one reading of 
public international law can be challenged. Scholarly literature has labeled this 
statement as “not correct” and “in contradiction with established obligations for 
States”.25 Specifically with regard to the international law of state responsibility, it has 
been argued that, “today a legal and rational basis exists for the development of a theory 
of responsibility of the state of origin of a [transnational corporation].”26 This has been 
recognized in other recent standard-setting exercises, as we seek to demonstrate below. 
 
III. CONTEXTUALISING THE GUIDING PRINCIPLES 
 
In what follows, we will contextualise the home and host State obligation to 
protect as defined in the Guiding Principles within the more general discussion about 
companies and human rights. More in particular, we will compare the Guiding 
Principles with the 1996 Maastricht Guidelines, the 2003 Norms and the 2011 
Maastricht Principles, as well as with positions taken in scholarly human rights 






                                                 
23 Ibid., para. 50. 
24 Ibid., paras. 18-19. 
25 N. JÄGERS, “UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Making Headway towards Real 
Corporate Accountability?”, 29/2 Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights 2011, pp. 159-163. Compare 
O. DE SCHUTTER, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction as a tool for improving the Human Rights 
Accountability of Transnational Corporations, 22 December 2006, available at 
cridho.uclouvain.be/documents/Working.Papers/ExtraterrRep22.12.06.pdf (last accessed 22 March 2012); 
M.T. KAMMINGA, “Holding Multinational Corporations Accountable for Human Rights Abuses: A 
Challenge for the EC”, in Ph. ALSTON et alii (eds.), The EU and Human Rights, Oxford University 
Press, Oxford, 1999, pp. 553-569, at 558-559. For a more hesitant assessment, see S. JOSEPH, “An 
Overview of the Human Rights Accountability of Multinational Enterprises”, in M. KAMMINGA and S. 
ZIA-ZARIFI (eds.), Liability of Multinational Corporations under International Law, Kluwer Law 
International, The Hague, 2000, pp. 75-93, at 79-80 and 85-87 and S. JOSEPH, “Taming the Leviathans: 
Multinational Enterprises and Human Rights”, XLVI Netherlands International Law Review 1999, pp. 
171-203, at 80-181 and 183-184. 
26 F. FRANCIONI, “Alternative Perspectives on International Responsibility for Human Rights 
Violations by Multinational Corporations”, in W. BeNEDEK, K. DE FEYTER, F. MARRELLA (eds.), 
Economic Globalisation and Human Rights, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2007, pp. 245-265, 
at 262. 
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1. The 1996 Maastricht Guidelines 
 
The Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights were adopted in 1996.27 The Maastricht Guidelines clearly went beyond the 
position that home States have sometimes the possibility, but never the obligation, to 
protect against heir human rights abuses. Guideline 18 reads: 
 
The obligation to protect includes the State's responsibility to ensure that private 
entities or individuals, including transnational corporations over which they 
exercise jurisdiction, do not deprive individuals of their economic, social and 
cultural rights. States are responsible for violations of economic, social and 
cultural rights that result from their failure to exercise due diligence in 
controlling the behaviour of such non-state actors. 
 
In the Commentary to the Maastricht Guidelines, it was made clear that 
“Inaction by a State in controlling the conduct of […] private entities [such as 
transnational corporations] will result in the State being assigned responsibility for the 
violations of the former.” 28 
 
2. The 2003 Norms 
 
While the Norms generally and primarily focus on the direct human rights 
obligations of business enterprises, they start off in the first paragraph by repeating the 
well-established human rights tenet that States have the primary responsibility for 
human rights, including the obligation to protect against business enterprises. Moreover, 
there is a savings clause that inter alia provides that nothing in the Norms should be 
construed as diminishing the human rights obligations of States.29 This suggests that 
business enterprises themselves have a complementary obligation, albeit simultaneously 
with States.30 
                                                 
27 The Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights were agreed upon by 
a group of experts on the occasion of the 10th anniversary of the Limburg Principles in 1997. The 
Maastricht Guidelines can be found in UN Doc. E/C.12/2000/13, 20/3 Human Rights Quarterly 1998, pp.  
691-704 and in T. VAN BOVEN, C. FLINTERMAN and I. WESTENDORP (eds.), The Maastricht 
Guidelines on Violations of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. Proceedings of the Workshop of 
Experts organised by the International Commission of Jurists (Geneva, Switzerland), the Urban Morgan 
Institute on Human Rights (Cincinnati, USA) and the Maastricht Centre for Human Rights of Maastricht 
University, 22-26 January 1997, SIM-Special no. 20, SIM, Utrecht, 1998, pp. 1-12. 
28 V. DANKWA, C. FLINTERMAN and S. LECKIE, “Commentary on the Maastricht Guidelines on 
Violations of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights”, in T. VAN BOVEN, C. FLINTERMAN and I. 
WESTENDORP (eds.), The Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights. Proceedings of the Workshop of Experts organised by the International Commission of Jurists 
(Geneva, Switzerland), the Urban Morgan Institute on Human Rights (Cincinnati, USA) and the 
Maastricht Centre for Human Rights of Maastricht University, 22-26 January 1997, SIM-Special no. 20, 
SIM, Utrecht, 1998, 13-34, at 29. 
29 Norms, para. 19. 
30 See our conceptualisation of distributing and apportioning of responsibility in W. VANDENHOLE and 
W. BENEDEK, “Extraterritorial Human Rights Obligations and the North-South Divide”, in M. 
LANGFORD, W. VANDENHOLE, M. SCHEININ and W. VAN GENUGTEN (eds.), Global Justice, 
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Kinley and Chambers see “the subordination of corporate responsibility to state 
responsibility” as a “key substantive feature”,31 but do not rule out joint responsibility 
for a state and an TNC within their respective spheres of activity and influence, in case 
a State fails his human rights duties e.g.32 They also envisage corporate responsibility in 
instances of complicity of a corporation in a State’s human rights violations.33  
 
3. The 2011 Maastricht Principles 
 
The Maastricht Principles focus exclusively on extraterritorial State 
responsibility, i.e. home State responsibility.34 Such State responsibility clearly extends 
to business enterprises that “are empowered by the State to exercise elements of 
governmental authority […]”,35 i.e. state-owned or state-controlled companies, but also 
business enterprises to which elements of governmental authority have been delegated 
through privatisation. As the (draft) Commentary explains, governmental functions also 
include “the provision of basic infrastructure, certain essential public services such as 
water and electricity, and traditionally public functions of the State such as education 
and, arguably, health.”36 
 
The (host and home) State obligation to protect against violations by non-State 
actors, including transnational corporations and other business enterprises, has been 
disentangled in the Maastricht Principles as an obligation to regulate, to influence and to 
cooperate. The obligation to influence is a minimal obligation, which applies “even if 
[States] are not in a position to regulate [the conduct of non-State actors].”37 Quite 
paradoxically, it is worded as a legally weak obligation (“should” rather than “must” 
exercise). The legally strong obligation (“must”) to regulate is limited to circumscribed 
positions to regulate, defined by leads such as territory; nationality; or simply a 
reasonable link between the State and the conduct. In addition and specifically for 
                                                                                                                                               
State Duties. The Extraterritorial Scope of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in International Law, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2013, forthcoming; compare Kinley and Chambers who argue 
that “the Norms provide for the imposition of contempareous and complementary human rights 
responsibilities on corporations within their ‘spheres of activity and influence’.” (D. KINLEY and R. 
CHAMBERS, “The UN Human Rights Norms for Corporations: The Private Implications of Public 
International Law”, 6/3 Human Rights Law Review 2006, pp. 447-497, at 21). 
31 D. KINLEY and R. CHAMBERS, “The UN Human Rights Norms for Corporations: The Private 
Implications of Public International Law”, 6/3 Human Rights Law Review 2006, pp. 447-497, at 462. 
32 Ibid., 467. 
33 Ibid., 455 and 468. 
34 For a criticism on the extraterritorial take on the issue, see Sara L. SECK, “Conceptualizing the Home 
State Duty to Protect Human Rights”, in K. BUHMANN, L. ROSEBERRY and M. MORSING (eds), 
Corporate Social and Human Rights Responsibilities, Pallgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2011, pp. 25-
51, at 28. 
35 Principle 12. 
36 O. DE SCHUTTER, A. EIDE, A. KHALFAN, M. ORELLANA, M. SALOMON and I. SEIDERMAN, 
Commentary to the Maastricht Principles on Extraterritorial Obligations of States in the Area of 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Advance unedited version of 29 February 2012, p 18, on file with 
the author. The Commentary will be published in Human Rights Quarterly. 
37 Principle 26. 
Contextualising the State Duty to Protect Human Rights as Defined in the UN Guiding Principles on 
Business and Human Rights 
Revista de Estudios Jurídicos nº 12/2012 (Segunda Época) 
ISSN 1576-124X. Universidad de Jaén (España) 
Versión electrónica: rej.ujaen.es 
- 9 - 
 
business enterprises, the centre of activity, place of registration or domicile, or main 
place of business or substantial business activities are mentioned as specifications of the 
active personality principle. An obligation to cooperate is incumbent on all States to 
“prevent human rights abuses by non-State actors, to hold them to account for any such 
abuses, and to ensure an effective remedy for those affected.”38 
 
Clearly, the Maastricht Principles go far beyond the Guiding Principles as far as 
the home State obligation to protect against human rights violations by corporations is 
concerned. The bases or leads for jurisdiction of home States are more broadly defined 
than under the Guiding Principles. Under the Guiding Principles, only the nationality of 
the perpetrator or the victim; substantive harm to the State; and specific international 
crimes are mentioned, whereas in the Maastricht Principles a reasonable link between 
the State and the conduct may suffice to create an obligation, and they spell out in much 
more detail how corporations and (home) States may be linked under the active 
personality principle.39 Regrettably, the division of responsibility between host and 
home State is not clarified in the Maastricht Principles either, which is more generally a 
weak point of the latter.40 
 
4. The CESCR 2011 Statement 
 
The CESCR 2011 Statement has clarified the primary obligations incumbent on 
States along the lines of the tripartite typology of obligations to respect, to protect and to 
fulfil. Under the protect obligation, the Committee explicitly addresses the obligations 
of home States: “States Parties should also take steps to prevent human rights 
contraventions abroad by corporations which have their main seat under their 
jurisdiction, without infringing the sovereignty or diminishing the obligations of the 
host States under the Covenant.”41 Likewise, under the obligation to fulfil, States of 
incorporation are said to be under an obligation to “encourage such companies to assist, 
as appropriate, including in situations of armed conflict and natural disaster, host States 
in building capacities needed to address the corporate responsibility for the observance 
of economic, social and cultural rights.” While these home State obligations may have 
been worded in rather weak terms, the Committee clearly holds that home States of 





                                                 
38 Principle 27. 
39 For an extensive elaboration on this point, see O. DE SCHUTTER, A. EIDE, A. KHALFAN, M. 
ORELLANA, M. SALOMON and I. SEIDERMAN, Commentary to the Maastricht Principles on 
Extraterritorial Obligations of States in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Advance 
unedited version of 29 February 2012, pp. 37-38, on file with the author. 
40 See W. VANDENHOLE, Emerging Normative Frameworks on Transnational Human Rights 
Obligations, EUI Working Paper RSCAS 2012/17, availabe at 
cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/21874/RSCAS_2012_17.pdf?sequence=1 (last accessed 28 June 
2012). 
41 CESCR Statement, para. 5. 
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We have argued that the Guiding Principles take a narrow and retrogressive 
approach to the human rights obligations of home States (and equally of direct 
obligations of transnational corporations). To the extent that they do address them, they 
tend to do so in soft and non-legal terms – with the exception of those relating to gross 
human rights violations in conflict-affected areas.  
 
For sure, home State responsibility alone will not be sufficient to address human 
rights impacts of corporations. Ideally, host and home State responsibility would be 
complemented by direct human rights obligations for corporations. Such a multi-layered 
and complementary regime would make it all the more important to also clarify how 
responsibility needs to be aportioned between the host State, the home State, and the 
company itself. The primary responsibility of the host State seems to go unchallenged, 
but what the scope of host State and direct company responsibility is, is yet to be settled. 
